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REEVALUATING DRUG POLICY:
URUGUAY's EFFORTS TO REFORM
MARIJUANA LAWS
John Faubion*
IN recent years, many countries have been reevaluating drug policy as
a result of changing perceptions and past failures in government
strategy. In 2010, marijuana was the most produced, trafficked, and
consumed recreational drug throughout the world, with an estimated
119-224 million adult users.' The United Nations estimates that annual
drug consumption from 1998-2008 increased by 8.5 percent for cannabis
(from 147.4 to 160 million users). 2
In Uruguay alone, the marijuana market is worth an estimated $75 mil-
lion U.S. dollars annually.3 Because of the significant financial and social
implications of illegal drug use, many countries are beginning to consider
different methods to modernize and improve their drug policies. New
and often increasingly liberal laws are being considered throughout the
world that would decriminalize personal using of cannabis, granting many
governments the benefits of taxation and regulation while accepting
many of the public safety and health risks associated with cannabis
consumption.4
This comment will analyze the new trend of decriminalizing personal
marijuana possession, consumption, production, and government regula-
tion of its growth, distribution, and sale, using Uruguay as a case study.
Legislation is currently pending in the Uruguayan Congress that would
create a completely state-managed, legal cannabis industry.5 Leaders of
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Latin and South American nations are under unique pressure to develop
strategies to combat the continually spreading and escalating drug-related
violence that permeates their nations.6 Existing law in Uruguay prohibits
distribution or sale of marijuana, but does not establish penalties for pos-
session related to personal consumption, focusing instead on illegal traf-
ficking of the drug.7 A bill has been proposed, and is now under formal
consideration in Uruguay that if passed, would establish a new level of
cannabis decriminalization, regulation, and state control previously un-
precedented in global drug policy.8
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Unlike many other nations, Uruguay has a relaxed and informal atti-
tude towards the possession and consumption of "lighter" drugs such as
marijuana and, as mentioned, current law does not prohibit nor punish
possession or consumption for personal use.9 In the United States, per-
ceptions have slowly but dramatically started shifting towards this view-
point, as shown through the difference of President Clinton's "I didn't
inhale" statement' 0 to President Obama's admission that "I inhaled fre-
quently . . . that was the point."" Throughout the world, the full spec-
trum of stances on this issue can be found, from absolute prohibition to
President Mujica's new radical platform that will make Uruguay the first
nation to completely decriminalize and regulate the sale of cannabis
through a national agency.
In 1974, the Uruguayan legislature passed Law 14.294, which avoided
establishing any specific quantity level of cannabis possession that would
per se be ruled as intended for person consumption.12 In 1998, Law
14.294 was amended and modified by Law 17.016, which did not define or
quantify central terms such as personal consumption.' 3 It is therefore the
responsibility of the judge to use his or her sole discretion to determine as
Market] (No. 534 de 2012), available at http://www.druglawreform.info/images/sto
ries/EN-UruguayBILL-cannabis.pdf [hereinafter Bill 534 of August 8, 2012].
6. Drug Carels Mark $64 Billion a Year from U.S., Mexican Says, LATIN AM. HER-
ALo TRIBUNE, http://www.Iaht.com/article.asp?Articleld=342471&Categoryld=140
91 (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
7. See Law No. 17.016 de 22 Octubre 1998 Dictanse Normas Referents a Es-
tupefacientes y Sustancias que Determinen Dependencia Fisica or Psiquica [Law
17.016 of October 22, 1998 Concerning Narcotics Rules and Determining Physical
or Psychological Dependence], REGIsRO NACIONAL DE LiYEs vY DEcREros 391/
002 de 29.10.2002 (Uru.) [hereinafter Law 17.016].
8. See generally Bill 534 of August 8, 2012 (Uru.).
9. Id.
10. Clinton Tried Marijuana as a Student, He Says, N.Y. TIMIas, (Mar. 30, 1992), http://
www.nytimes.com/1992/03/30/news/30iht-bill 1.html.
11. Barack Obama on Illegal Drugs, THE POLrITCAL GUIDE-, http://www.thepoliti-
calguide.com/Profiles/President/US/Barack Obama/Views/IllegalDrugs/ (last up-
dated July 27, 2012).
12. Uruguay, TiHE BECKLEY FOUND., http://reformdrugpolicy.com/beckley-main-con-
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guay/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
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a fact issue whether a defendant is in possession of marijuana for the
purpose of personal use or, in the alternative, if the purpose of such pos-
session in to engage in trafficking, in which case the defendant would be
subject to criminal repercussions if found guilty.14 This leaves an obvious
gap in law that the judiciary has been forced to work around, because
while the cultivation of cannabis is prohibited, its possession for the pur-
poses of personal consumption is protected by the same legislation.15
Forcing interaction between consumers and criminal organizations traf-
ficking prohibited substances or drug cartels is not a policy that Uru-
guayan drug officials would likely encourage, meaning the proposition
expressed in Law 17.016 that individuals have a right to personal con-
sumption, but are prohibited from cultivation, is a tenuous position diffi-
cult to explain or justify. This is a chief reason, among many others, that
modification of existing regulations is a serious and supported proposal.
In Uruguay, drug policy-at least in a criminal sense-has always been
more focused on the "harder" drugs that are readily available because of
their more volatile and destructive nature. For example, cocaine use in
the region has been constantly evolving since the 1990s, when a "paste"
first began to surface.' 6 By 2006, smokable cocaine was prevalent, a de-
velopment the Transnational Institute Drugs and Democracy Programme
suggests is a "consequence of the 'balloon effect' that has been transform-
ing, expanding, and moving cocaine production from the Andean region
to countries in the Southern Cone."' 7 It is not surprising to learn that
authorities would allocate their resources to combat the cartels that pro-
mote the intrusion and spread of drugs like cocaine and heroin before
concerning themselves with the personal consumption of marijuana.
Hard data demonstrates that policy changes-in at least some fash-
ion-may be justified by widespread drug abuse throughout South
America. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
released a report confirming that marijuana was the most common drug
consumed in the region.' 8 Furthermore, incidence of use by students
ranged from 4 percent in Peru to 23 percent in Chile.19 While Uruguay
has a very low crime rate, especially when compared to the region, vio-
lent crimes have increased in recent years, a fact some attribute to drug
traffickers increasingly utilizing the country as a base not only to establish
domestic operations, but also to ship drugs globally, especially towards
14. Id.
15. Law 17.016, arts. 30-31 (Uru.).
16. TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE DRUGS AND) DEMOCRACY PROGRAMME, PACO
UNDER SCRUTINY: TiHE COCAINE BASE PASTE MARKET IN AiRGNTINA, URU-
GUAY, AND BRAZIL 18 (Pien Metaal ed., Barbara Fraser trans., 2006).
17. Id. at 3.
18. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Subregional Report on Drug Use in
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the European market via Africa.20
II. COMPARISON TO OTHER NATIONAL DRUG POLICIES
An analysis of other national drug policies is relevant to any discussion
concerning Uruguay's sweeping new proposal, because just as former pol-
icies shape the ones now in place, future policies will also shape those yet
to come. Aware of the dramatic implications his legislation will have
should it pass, President Mujica's actions stirred other regional leaders to
examine their own domestic policies and consider similar legislation. 21
Similarly, the current agenda in Uruguay is certainly influenced by a
number of jurisdictions that have already experimented with unique
frameworks to regulate cannabis.
A. THE NETHERLANDS
The classic example of a state embracing a liberal cannabis policy is
that of the Netherlands. While Amsterdam is (in)famous for its roughly
220 coffee shops where marijuana and its derivates are openly sold and
consumed, the legal status of marijuana in Holland would surprise
many. 22 The Netherlands has made it illegal to "produce, possess, sell,
import, and export drugs;" the reason the coffee shop culture has devel-
oped is a distinction made in 1976 between "hard" and "soft" drugs. 23
The Dutch authorities consider hash and weed to be "soft" drugs and less
harmful to both consumer health-and society as a whole-because of
their status as sedatives. 24 To further the drug policy of Holland to re-
duce the demand, supply, risk to user, and impact on the public, the
Dutch government allows coffee shops to operate by selling small
amounts of soft drugs, a policy known as "toleration" through which the
criminal misdemeanor of selling soft drugs is not pursued by prosecu-
tors.2 5 This solution is based on the premise that a policy of prohibition
will be ineffective, and that people will continue using drugs regardless of
their legal status. It shifts the focus of law enforcement from individual
consumers to large-scale traffickers who profit from exploitation of prohi-
bition regulations. 26 The regulations that dictate the toleration policy in-
clude terms that limit sales to individual consumers to five grams of
20. Tim Padgett, Uruguay's Plan to Legalize Marijuana Sales: Should the Rest of the
World Follow?, TIME (June 26, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/06/26/uruguay-
wants-to-legalize-marijuana-sales-should-the-rest-of-the-world-follow/.
21. Damien Coruzzi, President Mujica Hopes to Manage Marijuana, COL-UMBI3A PoIur-
ICAL REVIEw, (Aug. 9, 2012), http://cpreview.org/2012/08/high-in-uruguay/.
22. David Jolly, Amsterdam Shops Selling Marijuana to Stay Open, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 2012, at A10.
23. Dutch Drug Policy, HoLLAND: TiE OFFICIAL SIn of HOLIANIo, http://www.hol-
land.com/us/tourism/article/dutch-drug-policy.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
24. Alcohol and Drugs, Gov'- OF TH NETH., http://www.government.nl/issues/alco
hol-and-drugs/drugs/soft-drug-policy (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
25. HoLLAND: TiHE OFFICIAL SIfE OF HOLLAND, supra note 23; see also Gov'-r oF TIE
NETH., supra note 24.
26. HoLLAND: TIm OFFICIAL SITE OF HOLLAND, supra note 23.
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cannabis per day.27 Coffee shops are also restricted to the sale of soft
drugs (cannabis and some of its derivatives); the sale of hard drugs re-
mains illegal.28 Additionally, sales may not be made to minors, and no
advertisement may be employed. 29 It is critical to note that the policy of
toleration is not designed to approve of drug use. On the contrary, the
purpose of the policy is to limit drug use and its impact on the public by
providing a closely monitored forum for cannabis consumers who would
otherwise resort to criminal traffickers to obtain their drugs-a sort of
subtraction by addition.30
In recent years, the toleration policy has been called into question as
the tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) element of cannabis-the primary
psychoactive component-has increased dramatically.3' Attempting to
fight this development, the Netherlands declared that cannabis containing
a THC content of 15 percent or more is now classified as a "hard" drug
not subject to the toleration policy. 32 The national government thought
to go much further when it announced a proposal to ban foreigners from
coffee shops and force local consumers into a "cannabis card" system that
would serve to validate their nationality and provide for registration in a
government database. As the Netherlands, particularly Amsterdam, de-
veloped a reputation as the "Mecca of Marijuana,"33 the national govern-
ment fought hard to eschew the image and the accompanying "late-night
revelry, traffic jams, and dealing in hard drugs" emerging as a response to
the drug tourist industry. 34 Prime Minister Mark Rutte attempted to im-
plement regulations that would limit each cannabis shop to a customer
base of 2,000 consumers and require shops to maintain records of those
clients while categorically prohibiting the sale of cannabis to foreigners.35
Facing criticism that little crime is associated with the marijuana industry
outside of Amsterdam and that the "cannabis card" system would merely
encourage a return to black-market drug sales, the Dutch government
abandoned its proposal, opting instead to allow local authorities to deter-
mine on a case-by-case basis what type of regulations serve their constitu-
ents' best interests.36 The New York Times quoted Dutch Justice
Minister lo Opstelten as saying, "the best way of seeing which measures




31. DrugFacts: Marijuana, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABusiE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/
publications/drugfacts/marijuana (last updated Dec. 2012).
32. Gov" oF THE NFTHu., supra note 24.
33. Jesse Anderson, Amsterdam: Interview at the Coffee Shop, INSPIRATION TRAVELS
(Dec. 8, 2012), http://inspirationtravels.com/2012/12/08/amsterdam-coffee-shops-
marijuana/.
34. Amsterdam Ditches Controversial 'Weed Pass', N.Y. DAn y NiEws (Nov. 21, 2012),
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/amsterdam-ditches-controversial-
weed-pass-law-article-1.1205634.
35. David Jolly, Dutch Plan to Restrict Marijuana Passes Hurdle, N.Y. TlES, Apr. 28,
2012, at A4.
36. Id.; see also Amsterdam Ditches Controversial 'Weed Pass', supra note 34.
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are effective is at the local level."3 7 Undoubtedly, the powerful lobby
that benefits from the multi-million dollar foreign "drug tourist" indus-
try-which in Amsterdam caters to an estimated one-fifth, or nearly one
and half of the seven million annual tourists-influenced this decision.38
The fierce opposition that major political figures such as Amsterdam
Mayor Eberhard van der Laan face when implementing new legislation
that impacts the tourist industry makes it clear that cannabis culture has
developed into a multi-million dollar industry firmly cemented in Dutch
law.39
B. PORTUGAL
While the Netherlands is generally thought of as the most liberalized
nation in terms of cannabis use and deregulation, Portugal has
decriminalized its drug laws to an even higher degree.40 In 2001, Portugal
became the first country in Europe to abolish all criminal penalties for
personal possession of drugs. 41 Portugal's decriminalization law is his-
toric in scope. It abolishes criminal sanctions not only for marijuana pos-
session, but also for possession of cocaine, heroin, and
methamphetamine, replacing prison sentences with optional therapy op-
portunities. 4 2 The concept behind this decriminalization effort is to focus
efforts towards health services for addicts rather than incarceration-a
policy proponents of the plan argue is more cost effective. A panel of a
psychologist, a social worker, and a legal advisor suggest what type of
treatment might best help the addict or offender, which he or she is then
allowed to accept or refuse without threat of criminal repercussions. 43
The CATO Institute published a paper reporting that following imple-
mentation of this decriminalization policy, illegal drug use in Portugal de-
clined and that the percentage of addicts seeking treatment nearly
doubled in five years.44 Author of the paper Gleen Greenwald declared
that, "judging by every metric, decriminalization in Portugal has been a
resounding success ... it has enabled the Portuguese government to man-
age and control the drug problem far better than virtually every other
Western country does."45 Time reports that Portugal's rate for lifetime
marijuana use is an insignificant 10 percent compared to a staggering 39
percent of American citizens, who despite facing some of the harshest
37. Amsterdam Ditches Controversial 'Weed Pass', supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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criminal penalties for drug use, boast the highest rates of usage in the
world.46 Like in Holland, the "Drug Czar" of Portugal, Joho Castel-
Branco Goulio, suggests that the new policy allows authorities to focus
their efforts on traffickers rather than consumers, a strategy that has seen
early success and produced significant benefits to curb drug-related
crime. 47 The central point that many advocates of decriminalization
stress is that Portugal provides evidence that decriminalization does not
result in increased drug use, while opponents stress serious skepticism
that the Portugal case study supports such dramatic conclusions, instead
urging that the statistics are the result of cyclical changes or unique
conditions.
C. COLORADO AND WASHINGTON STATES
While U.S. law is a separate issue from the development of Uruguayan
marijuana policy, the timing of new legislation passed in the states of
Washington and Colorado allows for interesting and relevant compari-
sons between the emerging policies of these jurisdictions and Uruguay.
In November 2012, ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington passed
by relatively narrow margins (55 percent in Washington, 52 percent in
Colorado) legalizing the recreational possession and consumption of ma-
rijuana, creating a state licensed, regulated, and taxed cannabis indus-
try. 4 8 On the same night, a similar proposal was handedly defeated in the
state of Oregon, Massachusetts eliminated criminal and civil penalties for
consumers with a "debilitating medical condition," and Arkansas rejected
a medical marijuana proposal.49
For many marijuana advocates, this was a major political victory. In
Colorado, state Amendment 64 was the vehicle that introduced mari-
juana reform. The legislation immediately legalized possession of one
ounce of marijuana for persons aged twenty-one or older when used for
personal consumption.50 Colorado citizens are also now legally entitled
to grow up to six plants for the purpose of personal consumption.5 The
State will not begin to issue licenses for commercial marijuana businesses
until 2014, once laws governing the regulation of this new industry are
passed.52 It is critical to note that while Amendment 64 legalizes mari-
Juana consumption and possession at the state level, federal law expressly
46. Id.; but cf. MARK A. R. KuLINMAN, WhnN BRUi- FoiRcE FAILS: How ro HAVE
Liess CRIME AND Lt ss PUNISIMENT (2010) (arguing that differences in size and
culture between Portugal and United States make this comparison inappropriate).
47. Szalavitz, supra note 40.
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prohibits marijuana use under the Controlled Substances Act.53 Addi-
tionally, local county or city government within Colorado may, at its dis-
cretion, pass ordinances banning recreational cannabis sale-an example
of a jurisdiction that has done precisely this is Douglas County.54
Amendment 64 also places important limitations on the freedom to
smoke cannabis, prohibiting smoking in public areas.55
The State of Washington also legalized the possession of less then one
ounce of marijuana for the purpose of personal consumption by adults
aged 21 or older.56 As in Colorado, it remains illegal to smoke the drug
in public places or to drive a motor vehicle under the influence of mari-
juana.57 Washington is also establishing a licensing system and regula-
tions for the industry before sales are legalized (expected to occur by
December 2013).58 Colorado's regulatory scheme is more similar to the
Uruguayan plan because it provides consumers the option to grow up to
six plants, while in Washington, users must buy from state-licensed
providers.59
Allen St. Pierre, executive director of the National Organization for
the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) expresses what the passage of
these state initiatives means to legalization advocates, writing, "[these]
elections have forever changed the playing field regarding cannabis pro-
hibition laws in America (and probably in large parts of the world,
too)." 6 0 On the other side of the issue, it is critical for residents of these
states to understand that consumption or possession of marijuana is still a
Federal crime, and the Drug Enforcement Agency issued a stark re-
minder of this, stating "enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act
remains unchanged" and that "when enacting the Federal Controlled
Substances Act, Congress determined that marijuana is a schedule I con-
trolled substance."61 University of Denver Law Professor Sam Kamin
explains the conflict, stating:
Every store that sells marijuana here is violating federal law. The
federal government could come in and seize assets. They could
charge people criminally. They could send people to jail for scores of
years. They have chosen, so far, not to do that. It simply can't go on
the way it is, it can't be a big industry and a Federal crime at the
same time.62
As Kamin asserts, the Federal government of the United States still has
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izing marijuana, creating a substantial political question regarding the
conflicting state and federal provisions of drug law that will be answered
in the near future. Commentators speculate that potential options might
include: (1) a hands-off approach; (2) enforcing federal law and raiding
state sanctioned facilities and users; (3) filing suit against the states to
prevent the construction of the regulatory agencies necessary to carry out
duties such as taxation and distribution of licenses, arguing the Federal
law preempts such action; or (4) Congressional amendment to the Con-
trolled Substances Act. 6 3 It is clear that due to limited resources, it is
very unlikely that Federal prosecutors will focus on individual consumers
operating in concert with state law. 6 4
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE URUGUAYAN PROPOSAL
Uruguay passed two decrees in 1999 in response to increasing problems
relating to drug related crimes and health concerns.65 One decree estab-
lished penalties and regulations regarding not just the sale and trafficking
of drugs, but also the illegal proceeds gained from such transactions and
the other addressed a number of public health concerns associated with
the infestation of drugs into Uruguayan society. 66 These measures were
not enough, because problems remained significant enough to force polit-
ical groups within Uruguay to consider legalization policies inconceivable
in the past.67
A. EXISTING LAW
To effectively analyze the impact the new regulatory scheme could cre-
ate, it is critical to consider Uruguay's current state of law. Law 17.016 of
1998 is the principle legislative rule governing the control of drugs within
Uruguay. Law 17.016 brought about significant change by changing the
classification of the term drug within the Uruguayan legal system because
"initially drug laws only dealt with narcotic and psychoactive substances
(sustancias estupefacientes y pisicotr6picas), but Law 17.016 also included
'chemical precursors or other chemical products." 68 Interestingly, rather
than define these terms itself, the Uruguayan legislature has deferred to
the universal definitions set forth in the United Nations 1961 and 1971
Conventions. 69
Articles 30 and 31 of Law 17.016 are especially germane to any discus-
sion regarding the criminal consequences of marijuana use. Article 30
63. Charlie Savage, Administration Weighs Legal Action Against States that Legalized
Marijuana Use, N.Y. TIMi~s, Dec. 6, 2012, at A20.
64. Id.
65. TRANSNAIONAL INST., Uruguay Decriminalization, http://www.druglawreform
.info/en/country-information/uruguayitem/208-uruguay (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
66. Id.
67. See generally Bill 534 of August 8, 2012 (Uru.).
68. TRANSNATIONAL INST., supra note 65.
69. Id.; see also United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961,
18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204.
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stipulates that those who produce plants to extract drugs inducing psy-
chological or physical dependence unlawfully shall be sentenced to prison
for a period between twenty months and ten years. 70 Article 31 extends
the reach of this prohibition by applying the same penalty contained in
Article 30 to those who import, export, distribute, or transport the same
prohibited drugs or those who possess such drugs for a purpose other
than personal consumption.71 Together, Articles 30 and 31 of Law 17.016
effectively criminalize production and trafficking of marijuana but do not
criminalize personal consumption. While 2012 saw the most significant
political action towards decriminalization, the idea is not new. Nearly
five years ago, former President Jorge Batlee revealed during an inter-
view that he was in favor of total drug decriminalization. 72 Explaining his
position and rational for supporting a viewpoint that, before, had never
been seriously considered, Batlee pointed to the economics of the situa-
tion, suggesting that by regulating the drug business, it would provide the
state a larger opportunity to attack the drug problem itself, and it would
become much less expensive to subsidize the treatment of citizens with
health problems stemming from unhealthy drug use.73
B. INITIAL PROPOSALS
In 2010, it became increasingly likely that decriminalization of mari-
juana would become an issue the Uruguayan legislature would seriously
consider when Congressman Luis Lacalle Pou drafted the first bill to con-
tain language to that effect. 74 Lacalle Pou's bill would attempt to "sepa-
rate users from the illicit trade as a way of attacking drug trafficking ...
[and establish] more severe penalties for drug trafficking."7 5 A serious
flaw that interested parties exposed with this proposal is that, similar to
existing Law 17.016, while decriminalizing personal use and establishing
significant penalties for drug traffickers, Pou's bill failed to create any
method to effectively separate personal consumers from traffickers, con-
tinuing to leave the issue in the hands of the judiciary. 76
Congressmen Nicolis Ntifiez, Fernando Amado, and SebastiAn Sabini
also introduced three other notable bills legalizing cultivation of mari-
juana for personal use during 2010.77 All three of these congressmen
come from distinct political parties, the Socialist Party (Partido Social-
ista), Colorado Party (Partido Colorado), and Popular Participation
Movement (Movimiento de Participatidn Popular) respectively.78 This
suggests that the underlying support for new drug policy is fairly uniform
70. Law 17.016, supra note 7, art. 30.
71. Id. art. 31.
72. MoNTEVIDEino COMM, Vam6 a Hacer Ese, George (May 5, 2008), http://www.mon
tevideo.com.uy/notnoticias 61409_1.html.
73. Id.






and difficult to divide by political lines. The Transnational Institute Drug
Law Reform Project identifies Sabini's bill as "the most sweeping of the
three" and specifies that it "allow[s] an individual to possess up to
twenty-five grams of cannabis and eight plans."79 Sabini calls the devel-
opment of these proposals a "profound change in approach" and that one
of the key objectives of this policy will be to "separate the market: users
from traffickers, marijuana from other drugs like heroin."80 This distinc-
tion between personal consumption and trafficking behavior provides the
first bright-line rule that can eliminate judicial discretion by setting objec-
tive criteria establishing per se personal consumption levels.
The same limits were used in a revision of the drafted bill released in
July of 2011 and signed by Ndfiez, Amado, and Sabini.81 In the Explana-
tory Statement accompanying this proposed bill, the purpose is described
as "seeking to avoid discretion by judges that generates legal uncertainty,
and establish clear mechanisms for access, specifying the amount of can-
nabis that can be planted for personal consumption . . . [and] to provide
[judges] with an objective element to streamline procedures and prosecu-
tions." 82 These procedures have the potential to prevent any miscarriage
of justice that can occur under the current discretionary system. For ex-
ample, while the Uruguayan criminal penalties are meant to apply only to
traffickers or commercial growers, those who consume can be mis-
characterized as possessing for "non-personal" purposes83 and it is with-
out doubt that occasionally a personal user is judged a commercial
producer or distributor and suffers the adverse consequences.
In February 2011, writer Alicia Castilla and craftsman Mauricio B.
were arrested and sentenced to incarceration for possessing fifteen and
seven plants respectively of cannabis for personal consumption. 84 These
arrests, combined with Uruguay's relaxed attitude towards personal mari-
juana consumption, ignited a wave of protests and a movement to free
both Castilla and the other Uruguayan citizens imprisoned for the culti-
vation of marijuana for personal use.85 When the demonstrators gath-
ered on the steps of the Uruguayan Supreme Court, their efforts
culminated in a statement by Court press spokesman Raul Oxandabarant
"recognizing the existence of a legal vacuum," and National Drug Agency
Secretary Milton Romani stating that "it seems not prudent and discred-
its drug policy that a sixty-six year old woman, clearly not a danger to
79. Id.
80. Damien Cave, South America Sees Drug Path to Legalization, N.Y. TIMIs, July 29,
2012, at Al.
81. Proyecto de Ley Plantaci6n y Consumo de Cannabis [Bill on Planting and Canna-
bis Use] (No. 958 de 2011) (Repartido No. 629) (Uru.).
82. Id.
83. Law 17.016, arts. 30-31 (Uru.).
84. TRANSNATIONAL INST., supra note 65 at 3.
85. Free Alicia Castilla: Uruguay on the Road to Legalize Cannabis, EUR. CoAL. FOR
JusT AND EFEuCnViE DRUG Pou cEt's, (Mar. 31, 2011 1:54 AM), http://encod.org/
info/FREE-ALICIA-CASTILLA-URUGUAY-ON.html [hereinafter ENCOD].
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public safety, is in prison." 86 Castilla, a writer from Argentina, alleges
that the plants in her home were solely for the purpose of personal con-
sumption and was quoted in the Spanish newspaper El Pais stating, "I
think it's an injustice that a person is in prison for planting what they
consume."87 After Castilla was found guilty under Article 30 prohibiting
planting of plants to extract drugs inducing psychological or physical de-
pendence, she was judged a trafficker by default and imprisoned, where
she wrote an open letter to gather additional support for her cause.88
Through this letter, which received widespread circulation among sympa-
thetic supporters throughout Uruguay, Castilla pointed out that she
grows and consumes for personal use, and she moved into the house that
was later raided only with the "intention of having a peaceful place to
spend [her] old age."89 The letter goes on to state that she was "subjected
to taunts and various forms of abuse" and that Canelones prison, where
she was incarcerated, was a "squalid and violent" prison where inmates
included murderers and crack dealers and that rats, cockroaches, and lice
were omnipresent.90 Congressmen like Mr. Sabini argue that these cases
are an unfortunate product of the current law regulating marijuana con-
sumption, production, and transfer, and that further, his proposed legisla-
tion would help to cure these undesirable results.
C. INTRODUCTION OF BILL 534
The Uruguayan Congress was officially presented with the initial draft
of Bill 534 decriminalizing the cultivation and harvesting of marijuana
plants in May of 2011.91 This draft was expressly supported through the
signatures of the Independent Party (Partido Independiente) and the Col-
orado Party (Partido Colorado) in addition to a number of representa-
tives from the controlling coalition of the Broad Front.92 Article 2 of the
Bill would overrule Law 17.016 and related decrees by approving state
regulation-direct or indirect-of "import, export, planting, cultivation,
harvest, production, acquisition in any capacity, storage, marketing, and
distribution of cannabis or its derivatives," potentially establishing Uru-
guay as the first nation in history to regulate marijuana.
According to the version of Bill 534 updated in December, the purpose
of state regulation and decriminalization of marijuana is to "protect, pro-
mote and improve the public health of the population through a policy
designed to minimize risk and reduce the harms of cannabis use, which
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quences and adverse effects associated with consumption." 9 3 The intro-
duction to the August version of Bill 534 similarly described the intent as
establishing a normative framework to permit regulation of the can-
nabis market with the intent of reducing the risks and potential harm
to those people who use marijuana for recreational or medicinal pur-
poses and who, having to obtain supply from the illegal market, have
to degrade themselves and become involved in criminal activities and
high-risk practices, and, in addition, expose themselves to contact
with consumption of drugs that are toxicologically riskier, which is
the case of coca paste, among others.94
As mentioned previously, the influx of dangerously addictive and detri-
mental forms of cocaine has been of primary concern to the Uruguay
Drug Agency, and it is therefore not surprising to see "coca paste" (a
cocaine derivative commonly smoked) explicitly referred to during in the
introductory statement. Uruguayan Defense Minister Eleuterio Fernan-
dez Huidobro has stated the goal is "strict state control over the distribu-
tion and production" of cannabis, and President Mujica calls it an anti-
crime measure.95
IV. LEGAL IMPACT OF BILL 534 BECOMING LAW 96
Because President Mujica's Broad Front coalition "enjoys ample ma-
jorities in both houses [of the Uruguayan Congress]," the current propo-
sal to further decriminalize and regulate cannabis is a near certainty.97
Bill 534 states, "the State will assume control and regulation of the activi-
ties of importing, producing, acquiring under any title, storing, commer-
cializing, and distributing cannabis or its derivatives under the terms and
conditions established in this respect in the implementing regulation."98
The bill's text goes on to assume further state control over "all other ma-
terial activity that is necessary before, concurrent or after, to implement
the activities [above]" and that "the activities .. . should be carried out
exclusively in the framework of a harm reduction policy that also alerts
the population to the consequences and harmful effects of cannabis con-
93. Proyectro de Ley CM 534 de 8 Augusto 2012 del Gobierno Uruguayo que Legaliza
la Marihuana [Bill 534 of August 8, 2012 Bill Concerning Government Regulation
of the Cannabis Market] (No. 534 de 2012), December 2012 Update, art. 1, availa-
ble at http://www.druglawreform.info/images/stories/proyecto-leyl-l-Texto-Diciem
bre20I2.pdf [hereinafter December Update to Bill 534].
94. Bill 534 of August 8, 2012, at intro. (Uru.).
95. Uruguay Plans to Legalise Marijuana Sale, At JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera
.com/news/americas/2012/06/20126215588289352.html (last modified June 21, 2012
11:59 AM); Padgett, supra note 20.
96. In order to analyze more specifically the individual sections within Bill 534, the
most recent version at time of this writing will be utilized (released December
2012). Because this version of Bill 534 does not have an official English version at
the time of this writing, analysis will be derived from independent translation.
97. Pablo Fernandez, Marijuana Law Introduced to Uruguayan Congress, YAnloo! FI-
NANCE (Nov. 16, 2012 10:01 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/marijuana-law-
introduced-uruguay-congress-21 0440802.ht tml.
98. Bill 534 of August 8, 2012, at 11 (Uru.).
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sumption, as well as the effects of lowering the risks and harm to the
population that could potentially consume cannabis established in this re-
spect in the implementing regulation." 99
A. REGULATION OF CANNABIS
While Title I of Bill 534 provides a brief description of the interests and
goals of the legislation, Title II goes on to address the legal issues directly
surrounding cannabis, separating the narcotic laws (Chapter 1) from is-
sues of public safety and health (Chapter 2).100 Article 3 begins the body
of this law by amending Article 3 of Law 17.016 through an outright pro-
hibition of planting, cultivation, harvesting, and commercialization of the
cannabis plant, subject to a few important exceptions.o'0 These include
areas such as scientific research, non-psychotic cannabis-also known as
hemp-and most notably, the production for personal consumption or
that by membership clubs.102 Personal consumption is also objectively
quantifiable in this bill for the first time in Uruguay's history of marijuana
regulation, and is defined as a harvest of "up to six cannabis plants" and
any collection from that planted product in an amount of up to 480
grams. 03 Membership clubs, a concept created by this bill, are to be con-
trolled by the Instituto Nacional del Cannabis (National Cannabis Insti-
tute or INC) and are defined to consist of no more than fifteen members,
legally entitled to grow up to ninety plants and collect from that planted
product an amount of up to 7,200 grams per year.' 04 The INC will record
these clubs and their memberships in order to implement effective regu-
lation, but the identities of members will remain protected. 05 Articles 30
and 31 of Law 17.016 would be substantially amended by passage of this
bill as well as by establishing criminal penalties consisting of incarceration
or a period of twenty months to ten years for either unlawful production
(Article 30) or unlawful trafficking (Article 31) of cannabis.106 Further-
more, Article 31 goes on to specify that any person transporting less than
forty grams of marijuana will be considered de facto as a personal
consumption. 107
B. PUBLIc HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS
Chapter 2 of Title II concerns itself with public and consumer health.108
Prudent measures are taken in these articles, including cooperation with
El Sistema Nacional Integrado de Salud (The National Integrated Health
99. Id.
100. December Update to Bill 534, tits. 1-II.
101. Id. art. 3.
102. Id. art. 3 § A-E.
103. Id. art. 3 § D.
104. Id. art. 3 § E.
105. Id.
106. Id. arts. 4-5.
107. Id. art. 6.
108. Id. ch. 2.
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Services) and El Sistema Nacional de Educaci6n Pablica (The National
Public Education System) to establish policies for the promotion of
health, methods to stem problematic cannabis use, and in addition, de-
velop avenues for consumers to engage in counseling or guidance to re-
duce the harmful effects that can accompany marijuana consumption.109
Article 9 prohibits advertisement of cannabis products in all prominent
forms of media, similar to the type of prohibitions many countries have
established against tobacco advertisements.' 10 Together, these provisions
attempt to establish safeguards that will curtail the negative effects of
abusive marijuana usage that could result from the relaxed avenues to
purchase the drug.
C. THE NATIONAL CANNABIS INSTITUTE
Title III is the most substantive section of Bill 534, because it estab-
lishes the INC, outlines its purposes, details its internal organization, and
most importantly, grants power with which the Institute is to carry out its
duties."' The INC's function will be to regulate all activities of the can-
nabis industry, from planting to distribution and storage; further, it will
highlight actions that could be taken by the Agencies, described in Chap-
ter II, to reduce risk associated with increased or abusive marijuana use,
and lastly, the INC will monitor compliance with the provisions outlined
in Bill 534.112
The second half of Title III concerns itself with the internal administra-
tion of the Institute by establishing positions and specifying organiza-
tion.' 3 The INC would be composed of a Board, an Executive Director,
and a National Advisory Council.11 4 The Executive Director would be
appointed for a term of three years by majority of the Board and confir-
mation by the President.' 5 The positions will be filled by relying on vari-
ous departments and ministries already established within the Uruguayan
government to supply experts from numerous fields including social de-
velopment, public health, agriculture, education, economics, and narcot-
ics.'1 6 While these representatives will undoubtedly help guide the INC
reach it goals, the task facing them will be unlike anything they have dealt
with in their previous positions. For example, because cannabis is a crop
grown like any other, it is prudent to appoint a representative from the
Ministry of Agriculture to provide advice and input. However, Uru-
guay's major agricultural endeavors up to this point have been wheat,
soybeans, and rice-the cultivation of marijuana will pose issues that no
one has prior experience with, and this collective group will need to form
109. Id. arts. 7-8.
110. Id. art. 9.
111. Id. tit. Ill.
112. Id. art. 12.
113. Id. arts. 14-20.
114. Id.
115. Id. arts. 16, 18.
116. Id. arts. 15, 20.
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creative solutions.117 Citizens will also have a voice through two direct
representatives on the Advisory Council; one appointed to represent the
membership clubs and another to represent the licensees. 18 Because the
licensees and cannabis clubs will be held to the regulatory standards de-
veloped by the INC and violations may result in significant loss of liberty,
inclusion of these groups is a practical move designed to negate any po-
tential due process concerns.
The most significant section of Bill 534 is Chapter III of Title III, which
outlines the various legal powers and responsibilities given to the admin-
istrative bodies of the INC.n 9 The INC is responsible for granting li-
censes to private entities engaged in the cannabis industry, as well as
granting memberships to the cannabis clubs. 120 Furthermore, the ICN
must keep records of all "self-cultivation" and use such records to moni-
tor compliance with the provisions of Bill 534 and issue violations.121 Vi-
olations may be dealt with by warnings, penalties, confiscations,
destruction, suspensions, disqualification, or closing of establishments,
but it remains within the discretion of the INC to determine what the
appropriate response will be for each specific violation.122 The INC
Board is given a general type of supervisory power, and it is free to dele-
gate specific responsibilities to more specialized entities within the INC,
such duties include control of personal decisions, budgetary planning, and
setting the cost of licenses.123 The Executive Director is responsible for
the implementation of the policies designed by the Board.124
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant parts of this Bill is the crea-
tion of a massive bureaucratic administration responsible for not only
regulation, but-to the extent the responsibilities are not delegated to
private entities-the activities of an entire industry.125 Many states find it
prudent to control certain vital or particularly dangerous industries. For
instance, there are hundreds of airlines worldwide in which a state is the
majority shareholder, thereby allowing close regulation of the transporta-
tion industry.126 Likewise, many states own and control their energy in-
dustries, the most obvious example being Saudi Aramco.127 The INC
would face the same challenges that typify many of these regulatory agen-
cies' day-to-day business should this Bill become law.
117. Cave, supra note 80.
118. December Update to Bill 534, art. 20.
119. Id. tit. III, ch. Ill.
120. Id. art. 22.
121. Id.
122. Id. arts. 22, 33-34.
123. Id. art. 23.
124. Id. art. 24.
125. See generally December Update to Bill 534.
126. See generally List of Government-owned and Privatized Airlines, INT'L AVIArION
ORG., http://legacy.icao.intlicao/en/atb/epm/ecp/PrivatizedAirlines.pdf (last visited
Oct. 4, 2013).
127. Our Company, SAuI ARAMCO, http://www.saudiaramco.comlen/home.html#our-
company%257C%252Fen%252Fhome%252Four-company.baseajax.htmi (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2013).
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There are many arguments suggesting that government control of in-
dustries is warranted and necessary when such industries serve critical
public interest or pose unique dangers.128 Certain functions, such as se-
curity, are vital to the state and could be considered non-delegable duties
of the government to safeguard; but most industries fall into a middle
ground, a prime example being the power industry.129 Many also argue
that government intervention in free enterprise restricts individual liber-
ties, is inefficient, and is overly burdensome, raising prices and reducing
the quality of service.o30 This is not a new battleground, and there are
valid points to be made by both parties. The struggle that the ICN will
face is to find an acceptable middle ground where it may achieve the
policy goals and regulatory functions prescribed to it through CM 534
while remaining an efficient and effective government entity.
V. ANALYSIS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR POLICY CHANGES
Examined in detail, Bill 534 would introduce a number of interesting
changes to drug law. Before introducing its substantive changes to law,
the August proposal outlines the framework and premises that lead to its
conclusions. This analysis begins by examining the history of drug regula-
tion, pointing out that criminal policy is relatively new and is fundamen-
tally based upon the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.' 3 ' For
decades, the framework of the Convention was not examined or chal-
lenged, as the policy appeared to work well; however, in more recent
times, the exacerbated drug violence has demonstrated that inflexible
Convention framework has "proven to be an inefficient, in reducing indi-
vidual and social harm associated with cannabis consumption."1 3 2
A. THE (FAILED) WAR ON DRUGS
A report by the Global Commission on Drug Policy states that "the
global war on drugs has failed . . . [and that] in practice, the global scale
of illegal drug markets-largely controlled by organized crime-has
grown dramatically." 3 3 South and Central American leaders have aban-
doned faith in United States strategy to combat drug violence after many
years without success; indeed, Time describes the attitude of the Colom-
bian President Juan Manuel Santos and the other participants in the Sum-
mit of the Americas as "drug-war-weary."1 3 4 A regional summit in
128. Arthur C. Brooks, America's New Culture War: Free Enterprise vs. Government
Control, WASI. POST (May 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/05/21/AR2010052101854.html.
129. Deregulating the Power Industry, PUB. BROAo. SERV., http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/blackout/regulation/primer.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
130. Brooks, supra note 128.
131. Bill 534 of August 8, 2012, nos. 1-2 (Uru.).
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also GionA! COMM'N ON DiRuc POiCY, RiEPolr ON THE WAR ON DRUGS
(June 2011), available at http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/
themes/gcdpvl/pdf/Global CommissionReportEnglish.pdf.
134. Pagett, supra note 20.
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Mexico prompted eleven Latin American nations to issue a joint state-
ment on organized crime and drug trafficking, declaring in point seven
that
[w]hat would be desirable, would be a significant reduction in the
demand for illegal drugs. Nevertheless, if that is not possible, as re-
cent experience demonstrates, the authorities of the consuming
countries ought then to explore the possible alternatives to eliminate
the exorbitant profits of the criminals, including regulatory or mar-
ket oriented options to this end. Thus, the transit of substances that
continue provoking high levels of crime and violence in Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean nations will be avoided. 135
From this language, it is clear a different strategy to combat drug
crimes has come into favor. The words "market oriented options" plainly
support decriminalization and regulatory policies.136 Bill 534 suggests
that the war on drugs was lost because of four major issues: (1) consump-
tion has increased and product seizure cannot hope to dent this increased
demand; (2) state funds have been mismanaged by investment into the
"war" and not basic human services; (3) a failure to address the demand
for drugs because of the insistence on combating supply; and (4) the crea-
tion of a "perfect monopoly for criminal activities" which, by enormous
financial incentive, creates a substantial reason to engage in trafficking.137
Expanding on the second point of this examination, Uruguay's Defense
Minister argued that the costs of drug interdictions, criminal prosecu-
tions, criminal penalties, and state-supported medical care are too costly
to continue fighting illegal drug trafficking and consumption in a manner
that fails to produce results.' 38 In sum, this analysis of the war on drugs
concludes by suggesting that "the 'cure' has becomes much worse than
the 'disease.'"139
This is a viewpoint that is shared across the world. British press has
reported that decriminalization trends are spreading "across much of Eu-
rope, Latin America, and beyond."140 These sources point to the Spanish
and Dutch policies as well as the fact that inside the United States-the
traditional base of support for the war on drugs-more than half of
Americans now support cannabis legalization, fourteen states have
decriminalized possession, and seventeen allow consumption for medical
135. Danny K, II Current Latin American Leaders Call for Exploration of Legal Drug
Regulation, TRANSFORM DRUG PoL ICY FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2012 10:55 AM), http://
transform-drugs.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/12-latin-american-leaders-call-for.html.
136. William Booth, Latin American Leaders Assail U.S. Drug 'Market', WASH. POST
(Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/latin-american-leaders-as-
sail-us-drug-market/2011/12/16/gIQAjyy630_story.html.
137. See Bill 534 of August 8, 2012, no. 2 (Uru.).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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American leaders point to domestic reductions in cocaine consumption
and an increase in drug prices to assert that winning strides have been
made in the drug war. 14 2 Moreover, seizures of methamphetamine, her-
oin, and marijuana are continually increasing. 143 Whether this data accu-
rately demonstrates success curtailing illegal drug activity is questionable.
The National Institute of Drug Abuse reports that drug use among teen-
agers in the United States continues at a high rate, and that marijuana
usage is increasing significantly, for example, the number of high school
seniors using marijuana within the past month increased from 18.8 per-
cent in 2007 to 22.9 percent in 2012.144 Critics of U.S. drug policy grow
louder every year. Mexican President Felipe Calder6n has traditionally
been a strong ally of the United States in its fight against drugs, but has
become a harsh critic as violence along the border grows and has left over
45,000 dead in Mexico.145 As the largest illegal drug market in the world,
the United States certainly bears some responsibility for the escalating
violence through South and Central America that has acted as the cata-
lyst to spur enactment of reform policies.146 Nicaraguan President Daniel
Ortega explained the situation simply, stating "all of the money, regard-
less of how much it is multiplied, and all of the blood, no matter how
much is spilled [will not stop the drug trade] so long as the north contin-
ues consuming."147
B. PAST CONCLUSIONS BASED ON INACCURATE INFORMATION
Modern policies supporting the prohibition of cannabis were based, in
a large part, on the notion that consumption was both a public safety
concern and detrimental to an individual's health. Both sides of the legal-
ization debate generate their own scientific reports and studies regarding
the health implications of marijuana consumption, often resulting in con-
flict and leaving room for argument, but there is evidence of some core
scientific premises widely accepted as true.
First, cannabis use by youth is to be avoided because marijuana has a
measurably worse propensity to detrimentally affect a younger con-
sumer. 14 8 Similar to tobacco and alcohol, as a younger person's brain
continues to develop, the chances it may be negatively affected by canna-
141. Id.
142. Booth, supra note 136.
143. Id.
144. DrugFacts: High School and Youth Trends, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://
www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/high-school-youth-trends (last updated
Dec. 2012).
145. Booth, supra note 136.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. INTL. CENTRE FOR SCI. IN DRuG Poicy, Toots rOR DEBATI.: US FEDERAL Gov-
E3RNMINT DATA ON CANNAS PROHIBITION 7 (Evan Wood, et. al eds. (2010))
[hereinafter ICSDP].
2013] 401
402 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 19
bis are higher than a mature adult's brain.149 Secondly, because cannabis
is most commonly consumed through smoking, typical respiratory con-
cerns are present.150 Perhaps most importantly, the short-term motor
function impairment accompanying "acute intoxication" results in diffi-
culty operating motor vehicles, presenting the greatest health and safety
risk.'51 The issue of cognitive impairment, or diminished capacity to
learn or recall information, is contested by various reports, but many
leading medical journals lean towards the supposition that heavy or
chronic marijuana usage may result in lasting, permanent limitations in
memory and related mental functions.152
While these health concerns cannot be ignored or overstated, it is im-
portant to view them in context. The International Centre for Science in
Drug Policy cites a British report which, "using a nine-category matrix of
harm spanning physical and social harms, ranked cannabis as less harmful
than alcohol and tobacco."1 53 There is widespread support for the notion
that marijuana is less dangerous to the public and the individual than
alcohol or tobacco. The Beckley Foundation released a report stating, "in
terms of relative harms [cannabis] is considerably less harmful than alco-
hol or tobacco . . . [and] many of the harms associated with cannabis use
are the result of the prohibition itself, particularly the social harms arising
from arrests and imprisonment." 1 5 4
Supporters of a major policy overhaul point to the fact that emerging
medical research shows marijuana does not negatively affect the body,
and that if used in a responsible manner, it may have credible applica-
tions in medicine. 55 Thus far, marijuana has been used in the medical
field to reduce the symptoms of cancer, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, pain,
glaucoma, epilepsy, and many other conditions.156 Cannabis consump-
tion is most commonly used to decrease the nausea common from chemo-
therapy treatment, increase the appetite of AIDS patients, and as a
replacement for synthetic pain relief. 57 Researchers at California Pacific
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found in marijuana called cannabidiol has been linked to preventing the
spread of cancer; this study was later published in the journal of Molecu-
lar Cancer Therapeutics. 5 8 Some patients-especially those suffering
from symptoms of nausea or loss of appetite-clearly find comfort from
medicinal marijuana, but the drug has yet to find an irreplaceable pur-
pose in of modern medicine.
The "gateway drug" argument suggests that even if we as a society ac-
cept that marijuana is not exceptionally dangerous itself, its use will inevi-
tably lead the consumer towards harder, more dangerous drugs like
heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamines.159 According to the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, someone who smokes marijuana is more than
104 times more likely to use cocaine than a person who never consumes
cannabis.160 More recently, studies have concluded that while there is
certainly a correlation between cannabis consumption and the consump-
tion of other drugs with more serious health consequences, the relation-
ship falls short of causation.161 In 1999, the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academy of Science wrote in a report to Congress the provides
in the relevant sections:
Patterns in progression of drug use from adolescence to adulthood
are strikingly regular. Because it is the most widely used illicit drug,
marijuana is predictably the first illicit drug most people encounter.
Not surprisingly, most users of other illicit drugs have used mari-
juana first. In fact, most drug users begin with alcohol and nicotine
before marijuana-usually before they are of legal age.
In the sense that marijuana use typically precedes rather than follows
initiation of other illicit drug use, it is indeed a "gateway" drug. But
because underage smoking and alcohol use typically precede mari-
juana use, marijuana is not the most common, and is rarely the first,
"gateway" to illicit drug use. There is no conclusive evidence that
the drug effects of marijuana are causally linked to the subsequent
abuse of other illicit drugs.162
Many theorize that legalizing and regulating the marijuana industry
will reduce access to other drugs by separating the consumer from the
illegal drug trafficker.163 The Netherlands employed this strategy to
"close the gateway" through the coffeehouse system and a 2010 Rand
Institute reports that there is "some evidence for a weakened gateway,"
and that in the least, the data "clearly challenge[s] any claim that the
Dutch have strengthened the gateway to hard drug use."' 64 The effec-
158. Astaiza, supra note 156.
159. Maia Szalavitz, Marijuana as a Gateway Drug: The Myth That Will Not Die, TIME,
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tiveness of regulation as a tool to close any "gateway" to hard drug use is
debatable, but policies that separate drug consumers from traffickers are
generally supported by South American nations including Uruguay as a
means to reduce collateral drug violence.165 The Rand Drug Policy Re-
search Center released a study in 2002 that suggests the gateway theory is
largely unsubstantiated by hard facts, and that in reality, consumers of
hard-drugs would be just as likely to engage in the same behavior without
marijuana consumption, providing an alternate explanation to the corre-
lation between marijuana and hard-drug consumption.166 Because the
gateway theory cannot be disproved through this method, the Rand brief
suggests that prohibition remains a viable policy so long as the harm it
prevents outweighs the cost it incurs.167
C. SEPARATING THE CONSUMER FROM THE TRAFFICKER
Another leading rationalization for the legalization platform is the pro-
tection of constituent-consumers. Differentiating the marijuana culture
from that of "harder" drugs such as heroin or cocaine, advocates hope to
minimize consumer exposure to the dangerous criminal gangs that now
traffic in outlawed substances while simultaneously cutting the profits and
power of those underground organizations. 168 One figure estimates that
cannabis consumers spend over $750 million U.S. dollars annually on the
product alone.169 Considering the peripheral market for paraphernalia
and related products, Uruguay is certainly looking at an unregulated, un-
taxed, and illegal $1 billion dollar industry. Uruguayan drug czar Romani
explains, "a drug policy that bases regulation on punitive laws has proven
to be insufficient and cause harm."170 Instead, the proposal seeks to fol-
low the Dutch model by separating the marijuana market from other
drugs, allowing marijuana consumers to purchase their drugs legally and
eliminate the possibility that when seeking marijuana, a customer would
be convinced to buy heroin or cocaine paste.' 7' Faced with past failures
and an uncertain future, countries caught in the middle of the illegal drug
trade are not unreasonable to consider new alternatives. As President
Jos6 Mujica stated regarding the new policy, regulation "would ruin [the
market] for marijuana traffickers"1 7 2 breaking new ground by establish-
ing a state operated cannabis market, and that "someone has to be
first."1 73
165. See Bill 534 of August 8, 2012, no. 3 (Uru.).
166. RANi) DRUG PoiLICY RESEARCH CENTER, USING MARIJUANA MAY NOT RAISE
uliE RISK OF USING HARDFR DRUGs 2 (2002).
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168. See Padgett, supra, note 20.
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM FOR POLICY CHANGES
A state operated marijuana dispensary is not a widely accepted con-
cept. It goes against the traditions established by law. Many interna-
tional organizations are expressing serious misgivings about the current
trend of policy shifting towards the decriminalization and regulation of
recreational marijuana usage. Mr. Raymond Yans, President of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board, has expressed "grave concern about
inadequately regulated medical cannabis schemes which can lead to in-
creased abuse."1 74 In addition, Mr. Yans points out that any move to
allow the recreational consumption of cannabis "would be a violation of
international law, namely the United Nations Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs of 1961."175 In many parts of the world, popular opinion con-
cerning the effects of marijuana has not changed in the thirty years since
Ronald Reagan asserted that, "I now have absolute proof that smoking
even one marijuana cigarette is equal in brain damage to being on Bikini
Island during an H-bomb blast."' 7 6
As outlined above, many advocates of substantial drug reform suggest
that the most effective policy is no longer one of prohibition, and that the
costs of continued criminalization of cannabis now outweigh the rewards.
The Uruguayan platform certainly adopts this position, looking at the
Dutch model as evidence that removal of criminal prohibitions surround-
ing marijuana allows for a desirable separation between the trafficker and
the consumer without resulting in substantial health risks or public safety
issues former policies were designed to avoid. Critics suggest that con-
trary to this train of thought, regulation and decriminalization will result
in a substantial increase in consumption that creates particularly undesir-
able results.' 77 Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter suggest that like the
legalization of gambling, the proliferation of cigarettes, and the erosion of
liquor controls, the decriminalization and regulation of cannabis would
result in widespread increase in consumption.17 8 Whereas decriminaliza-
tion without regulation (where sale remains illegal) retains the harms of
consumer-trafficker interaction, it also stifles the flow of cannabis by de-
nying advantages provided by the free market.17 9 Combining decriminal-
ization with regulation as Bill 534 does allows the proliferation of
174. Press Release, International Narcotics Control Board, INCB President Expresses
Grave Concern About Inadequately Regulated Medical Cannabis Schemes Which
Can Lead to Increased Abuse, UNIS/NAR/1165 (Mar. 15, 2013).
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ics Panel Says, U.N. Niews CENTRE (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewslD=44376&Cr=drug&Crl=#.UUgvTFt4ZgM.
176. Robbie Gennet, On Role Models and Their Bongs, HUFFINGTON Pos'r (Feb. 5,
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marijuana without marketing restrictions, creating a scenario that may
produce higher rates of prevalence than anticipated along with possible
negative consequences and availability may correlate with abuse. 180
A dramatic increase in marijuana consumption is worrisome for a num-
ber of reasons. Chief among concerns is the fact that cannabis is far more
potent today than ever before.' 8' In a letter to the New York Times,
former United States Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator Stephen
Green explains that in 1970, the THC content of an average marijuana
plant was one and a half percent; today, the THC content varies from 8 to
20 percent.182 This dramatic increase in potency creates a situation where
drug abuse is far more likely whether intentional or not. Dr. Nora D.
Volkow, director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse attributes the
increased potency to the dramatic increase in emergency room admission
and treatment programs for marijuana.183 Regardless of the precautions
taken, an increase in cannabis consumption will also result in an increase
in the amount of traffic accidents resulting from driving under the
influence. 18 4
Advocates of legalization are quick to point out that marijuana is not
known as a very addictive drug, and that it is virtually impossible to over-
dose when consuming it.185 While these points are generally true, they
disguise some of the true health issues that consumption of marijuana
entails. Early exposure to cannabis use consistently results in loser cogni-
tive brain function and a loss in IQ points over time.186 Other effects of
marijuana consumption can include acute short-term memory loss,
slowed reaction time and impaired motor coordination, altered judgment
and decision-making, and increased heart rate.187 The National Institute
on Drug Abuse reports that "heavy marijuana users report lower life sat-
isfaction, poorer mental and physical health, relationship problems, and
less academic and career success compared to their peers who came from
similar backgrounds." 88 Furthermore, cannabis users are at nearly five
times higher risk of heart attack; they may also experience respiratory
illnesses, hallucinations, and paranoia.189 Marijuana consumption during
pregnancy is particularly alarming. The exact effects are unknown and
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serious, possibly resulting in inutero fetal death, stillborn children, and
infant death shortly after birth. Children that survive may have perma-
nent behavioral and biological abnormalities.190
Supporters of liberalized cannabis policies assert that the implementa-
tion of a regulatory scheme would create substantial tax benefits for gov-
ernment and result in substantial job creation, but in truth the economic
incentives will be offset by the cost incurred by the public.191 By analyz-
ing tobacco and alcohol-two drugs that are regulated and taxed-and
applying to same principles to a cannabis model, it is clear that the socie-
tal costs are much higher than any revenue generated by the industry.192
Within the United States, tobacco and alcohol costs, through health care,
criminal justice, and lost productivity in the workplace total more than
$385 billion, and total government revenue totaled just under $40 bil-
lion.193 It seems clear that regulation of marijuana would likely add to a
deficit, rather than eliminate one.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. PRINCIPLE REASONS FOR CHANGE IN URUGUAYAN DRUG POLICY
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is now over fifty years old.
It is not surprising that some nations do not find that the Convention's
foundation or tenants still serve their interests or accomplish their goals.
The framework of the U.N. Convention is no longer a feasible vehicle
through which effective drug policy may be orchestrated. As violence
tears apart drug-producing nations and wears on the borders of massive
drug-consumers such as the United States, nations like Uruguay must
make hard decisions to fight for a better future. Rather than continue to
pour assets into war and fighting a large, powerful criminal underground
with limited resources, Uruguayan leaders are attempting to isolate the
enemy. They seek to achieve this by separating the drug consumer and
drug trafficker, and treating the two differently.
B. WHAT FORM WILL NEW POLICY TAKE
Uruguay will make history if the legislature passes Bill 534 and the
state begins to build an administrative entity responsible for the regula-
tion of commercial, recreation marijuana. An entirely new branch of
government, operating in the form of the INC, would be responsible for
the nation's marijuana industry. Not only will the government set prices,
grow, transport, and sell under such a scheme, but it will also grant li-
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censes, establish clubs, and set the new norm within the country regarding
the transaction of cannabis. Perhaps with time, the INC will delegate its
powers and responsibilities to private companies interested in the oppor-
tunity to engage in the cannabis trade. Because a government has never
before regulated the cannabis industry, many will carefully observe the
steps Uruguay takes and the decisions it makes along the way. The regu-
lation of any drug is not an easy task for a government to accomplish. At
the very least, Uruguay has the Dutch and the Portuguese models to ref-
erence while shaping this innovative new regulatory scheme. It is not
inconceivable that-should the current trend of decriminalization con-
tinue-Uruguay would pave the road for more nations to follow in its
footsteps.
C. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE REGION AND
INTERNATIONAL REACTION
Uruguay sits in a region where drug policy is incredibly unstable. That
fact makes the outcome of the Bill and the INC even more interesting.
As drug-related violence continues, Central and South American nations
are becoming increasingly desperate for any potential solution. This
makes it likely that many countries neighboring Uruguay may adopt a
wait-and-see type approach to determine whether there is any probability
that a similar scheme could work elsewhere. A region waiting for solu-
tions to drug-related violence is ready to domino into a new era of
decriminalized and regulated cannabis. The United States has yet to re-
act to Uruguay's pending legislation, but with its own states enacting leg-
islation of the same tune, it's doubtful that the United States will apply
significant diplomatic pressure in order to keep current policies in place.
While the war on drugs has not hurt the United States in the same way it
has its neighbors to the south, popular opinion is slowly but clearly shift-
ing, and after thirty years, it is apparent that the time has come for new
policies. As the largest consumer of drugs in the world and the globe's
superpower, U.S. reaction to new policy has tremendous power. Success
or failure of the Uruguayan Bill will likely be determined within the next
year as President Mujica's legislative coalition remains in power. If suc-
cessfully passed and implemented, Uruguay's regulation of marijuana will
profoundly affect the region. As decriminalization of cannabis gains
more political support and more jurisdictions begin implementing similar
policies, models like Uruguay's will shape government policy of the
future.
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